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UNDERSTANDING THE TIME PATH OF
CRIME
JOHN J. DONOHUE*
With all of the random factors that influence the amount of
criminal conduct, it is virtually impossible to fully explain or
precisely predict the crime rate at any point in time. If the
World Trade Center bombers had succeeded in their goal of
toppling the. massive towers, tens of thousands could have died
in New York that one day in 1993. The nation's annual murder
rate would have doubled or tripled from one incident. Fortu-
nately, such extreme catastrophes are rare-the comparatively
minor but still horrific killing of 168 residents of Oklahoma City
in 1995 was too small against the background of 21,600 murders
across the nation to have a pronounced effect on the U.S. mur-
der rate in that year.1 There will always be random events that
escalate the rate of crime, such as innovations in illegal drug
markets, and, similarly, random events that tend to depress it,
such as bad weather (it keeps the criminals at home), charis-
matic religious leaders, or widespread reductions in enthusiasm
for illegal drugs.
The primary goal then, in understanding the long-run
trends in crime and what is likely to happen in the future, is to
take one's focus off the short-term fluctuations so one can iden-
tify the stable long-run patterns. Distinguishing stable trends
from temporary fluctuations is essential to understanding how
crime is affected by changes in criminal justice policy, as well as
by varying social, economic, and demographic influences. If we
confuse fluctuations with trends, our predictions of where crime
* Professor of Law and John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Stanford
Law School. I would like to thank Bernard Black, George Fisher, Mark Kelman, Steve
Levitt, Peter Siegelman and participants at faculty workshops at Stanford Law School
and the University of Michigan Law School for their helpful comments, and Connie
Taylor and Craig Estes for outstanding research assistance on this paper.
I BUREAU OF JUsTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. D.P'T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE STATISTICS, at 106 tbl. 3 (1996) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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is headed can be wildly inaccurate, and our search for causal
explanations of recent patterns can be very misleading. For ex-
ample, as we reflect upon the exciting and salutary recent sharp
drops in crime, it makes a huge difference whether these are
just temporary improvements varying around a long-term un-
changed trend or the signal of a precipitous and sustained im-
provement from the previous pattern of slow decline that has
been operating for two decades. Similarly, in trying to explain
the very recent sharp drops in crime, one must exercise care in
attributing causal significance to forces, such as the sharply ris-
ing rate of incarceration, that have been operating relentlessly
for a quarter of a century.
This paper, then, will attempt to sort out the long-term
trends in crime over the last fifty years from the short-term fluc-
tuations around those trends. As we will see, there have been
two clear long-run trends in crime over the last half century:
one involving sharply rising crime until the late 1970s, followed
by the second, a period of slow decline over the next two dec-
ades. As one might expect, there have been considerable sh6rt-
term fluctuations around the two long-run trends, and indeed,
the later period has experienced greater variability in crime
around the long-term declining trend than had been the case
during the initial period of the rising secular, or long-term,
trend in crime.2 Part I documents these broad patterns, and
discusses how they illuminate the issues of why crime has fallen
and where it is likely to be headed in the future. Part II builds
upon this discussion to show that increased levels of incarcera-
tion and favorable demographic shifts contributed to the slow
decline in crime over the last two decades, but cannot explain
the sudden drop in crime in the mid-1990s after the abrupt in-
creases in crime of the late 1980s. The reasons for the short-
term fluctuations are probed and various positions that were ad-
vocated during the conference are evaluated. Part III concludes
2 No one appears to have commented on the increase in the variability of crime
over the last twenty years. Conceivably, the policy of massive incarceration could have
been a destabilizing influence that leaves a community more vulnerable to pernicious
influences such as the crack epidemic. Perhaps, too, there is some factor that makes
crime less variable when it is rising rapidly, as it did prior to 1977.
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by noting that the growing cost of incarceration suggests that, at
some point, the public will call for an end to further increases in
the number of prison inmates. Since increasing incarceration,
more police, and favorable demographics have been modestly
offsetting the influences pushing towards higher crime, when
the increases stop and the demographic trends turn unfriendly
(as they now have), crime will begin a slow secular rise for the
first time in two decades, unless some other force (better polic-
ing strategies, effective social programs) controls crime or the
unknown long-term criminogenic forces in society (the break-
down in the family, pernicious media influences, declining
schools, growing drug use and drug markets) abate.
I. THE PATTERN OF HOMICIDES OVER THE LAST HALF CENTURY
A. DISTINGUISHING LONG-TERM TRENDS AND SHORT-TERM
FLUCTUATIONS
Because of the poor quality of the data published by the FBI
over the last half century, it is very hard to provide a compre-
hensive and accurate assessment of the long-run patterns of all
aspects of crime. It is possible, though, to focus on the one
crime-murder-that is well measured, and for which a reliable
long-term time series can be created. While homicide data may
not be perfectly reflective of the time trend in all crimes, it does
seem to follow the pattern of most other street crimes fairly well
during the recent periods when more accurate data is available
for these other crimes.3 Thus, while murder may not be a per-
fect proxy for crime, it is simply the best we have. For the rest of
this paper, then, I will rely on murder data to define and ex-
3 Blumstein and Rosenfeld show that murder and robbery rates (as measured by
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)) track each other quite closely over the last two
decades. Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88J. CRiM. L. & CRiMINOLOGY 1175, 1176 fig. 1 (1998). Gary LaFree
also finds that the recent decline in murder rates has also been replicated for other
crimes. He concludes that "data from the UCR and the National Crime Violence Sta-
tistics (NCVS) strongly support the conclusion that there have been substantial,
broad-based declines in street crime rates during the 1990's." Gary LaFree, Social In-




plain the broad patterns in crime over the last five decades.
Figure 1 plots the national homicide rates from 1950 through
1997.
National crime patterns can be thought of as being com-
posed of long-term trends and short-term fluctuations around
these long-term trends. Figure 1 also plots two trend lines (the
predicted murder rates), which reveal that from 1950 to 1977
the murder rate rose at an annual rate of 4.4%, and from 1977
through 1997 it fell at a rate of roughly 0.6%. 4 At the same
time, there has been substantial deviation around the trend.
Over this forty-eight year period, the two predicted homicide
trend lines explain almost two-thirds of the variation around the
mean national murder rate of 7.32 per 100,000. Thus, analysts
need to find explanations for both the two long-term trends-
one strongly adverse for the period before 1977, and one mildly
benign for the subsequent period-as well as for the variations
above and below these trends.
This descriptive scheme aids in the process of explanation
since it clarifies the need to find long-term explanations for the
steady long-term trends in crime, and more episodic and vari-
able explanations for the short-term variations about the long-
term trends. For example, if one is trying to explain the post-
1977 downward trend in crime, the sustained increase in incar-
ceration rates over this period is certainly part of the explana-
tion. At the same time, this steady increase in incarceration is
not a reasonable explanation for the sharp drop in crime
that has
'The two trend lines, or predicted murder rate lines, were calculated by regressing
the natural logarithm of the murder rate on two time trends. The highest adjusted R-
squared value was obtained when the break in the time series came in 1977. The re-
gressions were performed using the Hildreth-Lu correction for serial correlation.
(When ordinary least squares regression was used, the break in the series came in
1978.)
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occurred since 1993. 5
B. WE CAN'T KNOW WHERE CRIME Is HEADING WITHOUT KNOWING WHY IT
HAS FALLEN
Perhaps the most important lesson from Figure 1, though, is
that the excitement over the prospect of a sustained sharply
lower crime rate may be premature. Posit, for a moment, that
the post-1977 linear predicted homicide rate truly represents
the current long-run trend in crime. In this event, we can obvi-
ously be happy that crime is headed downward, but the eupho-
ria of the last few years must be tempered by the realization that
the slope of the long-term downward trend is obviously much
more gradual than that of the recent drop. We would achieve
an enormous public policy victory if we could engineer a return
to the low crime rates of the 1950s and early 1960s. But if the
post-1977 linear time trend shown in Figure 1 accurately reflects
the long-run trend in homicide, then it will be a very long time
before that goal will be reached.6
I do not mean to be pessimistic, and I would love to think
that we have entered a third phase in the post-World War II pat-
tern of homicide, in which homicide rates will now be falling
more sharply into the future. There are certainly reasons why
any trend in crime tends to gain momentum.7 But as I look at
Of course, one could tell a tipping story in which the relentless pressure on
criminals imposed by the steadily climbing rates of incarceration finally led to a shift
away from criminal behavior. The evidence seems to suggest, however, that most ef-
fects on crime from more punitive forms of criminal justice come relatively quickly
(although one must also concede that it is more difficult to tease out more delayed
effects of policy from the imperfect data). See Steve Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punish-
ment, 106J. POL. ECON. 609 (1998) (showing that a drop in crime comes immediately
at the age of majority, in response to the greater severity of punishment).
6 The murder rate in 1965 was 5.1 per 100,000. If the post-1977 linear trend were
to continue, the murder rate would not fall to this level until the year 2084.
' If crime is decreasing, one would expect, at least over some period of time, there
would be an increasing rate of police presence per unit of crime, which would in-
crease the likelihood that criminals would be caught. Moreover, those criminals who
are convicted might well face a greater likelihood of receiving a long prison sentence,
since the prison cells are already built and might as well be used. Moreover, many
individuals decide what practices to engage in by observing the behavior of others. If
fewer people are committing crimes, there will be fewer negative role models and
perhaps a greater social disapproval of crime in general. See Dan Kahan, Social Mean-
ing and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 1156 (1998).
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Figure 1, I cannot rule out the possibility that the last five years
are similar to the first five years of the 1980s. If so, then we
might expect that the present period of rapidly declining mur-
der rates will be followed by an increase, as the national homi-
cide rate returns to its more gradual long-run pattern of
decline. In a few years, of course, we will have a better answer to
this question: if the crime rate continues to fall at its current
rate, then it will likely mean that there has been some shift in
the fundamentals of homicide, instead of a benign short-term
variation about the unchanged post-1977 long-run trend.8
1. Alternative Time Paths of Crime
Of course, there is nothing set in stone about the way that I
have modeled the last half century of homicide rates as having
an upward trend before 1977 and a downward trend thereafter.
I simply allowed the data to have one break in the series, and
then found the line of best fit across all possible years in which
the break could occur. Thus, the statistical data indicate that if
there is to be only a single break in the time trend, this break
occurred in 1977. But two qualifications should be mentioned.
First, it is conceivable-as some commented at the confer-
ence-that homicide rates over the last fifty years are better ex-
plained by a single curvilinear trend rather than by the two
linear trends shown. in Figure 1. Figure 2 graphs just such a
quadratic equation.
If Figure 2 depicts the true core pattern of homicides, then
it is apparent that homicide rates will be restored to the low lev-
els of the early 1960s fairly quickly. In fact, Figure 2 predicted
the homicide rate would fall to the 1965 level within five years.9
The reason for this sharply different prediction is that the pre-
dicted homicide-rate curve in Figure 2 gives far greater weight
to the observed sharply downward trend in crime over the last
' Note, also, that our estimate of the post-1977 trend itself would be affected by
additional drops in the crime rate. In other words, if crime drops for another few
years, the estimated long-run decline would be steeper than we believe today.
" This equation predicts that in the year 2002, the murder rate would fall to 5.1 per
100,000, which was the level in 1965.
1998] 1429
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few years. But visual inspection suggests that the predicted
homicide-rate curve in Figure 2 does not conform to the data
nearly as well as the predicted homicide-rate curve in Figure 1.
In fact, the adjusted R-squared value of the Figure 2 curve is less
than half the value of the predicted homicide-rate curve in Fig-
ure 1, which suggests that the Figure 1 curve is preferable.
2. Has a Third Linear Trend in Crime Emerged?
I have just concluded on the basis of statistical grounds that
the pattern of homicides over the last half century is better ex-
plained by two linear time trends than by a single quadratic
equation. But two other options should also be considered.
The Figure 1 analysis implicitly assumes that there is a funda-
mental trend in crime and then some random variation about
that long-term trend. In this view, the recent drop in crime is
simply a benign movement around the long-term trend, which
means that one should expect a return to the long-term path of
crime in the next few years. Nonetheless, it is also possible that
the fundamental trend in crime itself has been altered (as it was
once before in the last fifty years-in the late 1970s). In this
event, an additional break in the post-1977 linear trend reflect-
ing a much faster downward movement in crime would have re-
cently emerged. The explanation for any such fundamental
shift must then come from some recent change in the circum-
stances that influence crime. Accordingly, any explanation
based on a factor that has operated for decades-such as in-
creasing incarceration or gradual long-term changes in major
social institutions-cannot be the source of such a recent shift
(barring some tipping model story that the sustained pressure
"broke the back of crime"). One candidate that conceivably
could explain the benign fundamental shift is that the police
have recently discovered and implemented a more effective ap-
proach to law enforcement. This is frequently offered as an ex-
planation behind the dramatic recent drops in crime in New
York.'Y If such an improvement has occurred, the spreading of
10 See, e.g. George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders'
views of the New York City Story, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217(1998).
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these crime-fighting approaches to other jurisdictions could en-
able further sharp drops in crime to be achieved.
But even if a third more sharply declining long-term trend
has begun, it would not "confirm widely reported evidence of a
dramatic reversal in the nation's long-term trends in crime."'
Rather, it would show that the two-decade-long slow reduction
in crime had been replaced by a faster decline at the same time
that a short-term spike in crime was being reversed.
3. A Discontinuous Drop in Crime?
Another possibility, however, is that the slope of the long-
term trend in homicide has not changed but that crime has sud-
denly dropped down to a lower level by virtue of some one-time
but continuing benign influence. In this event, the homicide
rate would continue to decline at the roughly 0.6% rate per year
shown in Figure 1, but this slow decline would start from the ac-
tual 1997 below-previous-trend level of 6.7 per 100,000 (rather
than the predicted level of 8.4 per 100,000). This discontinuous
drop in crime that starts around 1993 conceivably could be
caused by a sudden event such as a sharp increase in the num-
ber of police. Such an increase could induce a drop in crime,
but would probably not cause crime to continue falling at the
same unusually precipitous rate of the last few years. This is of
course a more optimistic story than the one suggesting that re-
gression to the long-term trend will lead to crime increases in
the next few years, but it still implies that we are a long way off
from the lower-crime days of the 1950s and early 1960s. Indeed,
if this were the true path of crime, then the homicide rate
would still not reach the 1965 level of 5.1 per 100,000 for 48
years.
While it is possible that we have just experienced a discon-
tinuous drop in crime, it is not clear that an increase in the
number of police is what caused the drop. The annual in-
creases in the number of police do not seem to be large enough
to generate a sharp drop after 1993. At least as far as one can
tell from the FBI data, the rate of officers per 1000 residents in
" James Risen, U.S. Violent Crime Drops Record 7%, L.A. TIMES,June 2, 1997, atAl.
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American cities was 2.2 in 1990, did not reach 2.3 until 1995,
and was at 2.4 per 1000 as of Oct. 31, 1997 (the last date for
which data are available). These increases in the national
counts of police seem too small to spur an abrupt recent drop
in crime, although perhaps more recent data will better eluci-
date this issue. Conversely, in New York City, the increase in po-
lice in recent years was substantial enough and linked closely
enough to the drop in crime to encourage the view that the in-
creased number of police really did play a substantial role in
NewYork City's dramatic crime reduction.3
C. SUMMARY
Based on this broad, initial assessment of Figure 1, the three
most likely predictions about crime over the next decade, which
I order from most pessimistic to most optimistic, are:
The Post-1977 Trend Continues- This is the most parsimonious
story to emerge from Figure 1. If, in fact, nothing fundamental
has changed, the long-run rate of homicides will continue to be
dictated by the post-1977 linear trend line. In this scenario,
crime is currently below its long-term trend rate, so one would
expect that it will rise to return to the original trend line, with
continuing oscillations around the slow downward trend. Con-
sequently, the best estimate is that crime in ten years will be
higher than it is today. The Figure 1 regression would predict
that the homicide rate in 2007 would equal 7.9 per 100,000 in-
habitants, while the actual value in 1997 was 6.7. Although the
long-run trend in crime would be downward, it would continue
12 These data, which come from the Uniform Crime Reports, are problematic in
that they are not recent enough to fully document the latest trend and they count
full-time police department officers for only those cities that report, which is not a
constant sample over time.
'3 Over the period from 1992 though 1996, the number of New York City police of-
ficers grew from roughly 28,000 to 37,000. This 31% increase in its police force was
sizeable enough to be expected to have played a major role in the 51% decline in




falling at such a slow pace that the prospect of a return to the
low crime rates of the early 1960s would be very distant. 4
The Post-1997 Trend Continues Following the Discontinuous Drop
in Crime. In this scenario, there has been a recent one-time jolt
to the system that has dropped crime down to a lower-but-
parallel trend path to that shown for the post-1977 period in
Figure 1. In this event, the best estimate of the murder rate in
ten years is 6.4 per 100,000 (down from the 1997 value of 6.7),
but without further change in the trend, the country would not
be restored to the 1965 level of 5.1 per 100,000 until the year
2037.
A New Long-Term Trend: In this final scenario, the crime re-
ductions of the last few years have signaled a new benign trend,
and crime will continue falling. Presumably, the drop would
level off in the next five to ten years at about the level of four to
five per 100,000 that we saw in the 1950s and early 1960s, which
would imply that further substantial drops in crime await us in
the next few years.
As we will see in Part II (A) below, there may be reasons to
add to this list of plausible outcomes another, more pessimistic
scenario, in which the future long-term trend will change, but
for the worse.
II. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK To EVALUATE CAUSAL
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DROP IN CRIME
The framework developed in Part I can be usefully applied
in evaluating some of the competing explanations that have
been offered for the run up in crime in the late 1980s and the
recent sharp drops in crime. The excellent papers by Alfred
Blumstein and Richard Rosenfeld, and by Jeffrey Fagan, Frank
Zimring, and June Kim document two important findings that
correspond closely with the Figure 1 story of a long-term post-
1977 decline in homicide with substantial short-term fluctua-
" The projected return to the 1965 level would be in the year 2084, which is so
far off that the likelihood that the trend would continued unchanged for that long
seems extremely remote. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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ions around this trend.'5 First, there has been a steady drop in
non-gun homicides and homicides by adults.' 6 Second, begin-
ning in the mid-1980s, gun homicides by juveniles skyrocketed,
and after about 1993, they fell sharply. 7 The first of these find-
ings corresponds with the long-term post-1977 decline in homi-
cides depicted in Figure 1, and the second of these findings
explains the sharp run up in homicides in the late 1980s and
then the sharp run down in the mid to late 1990s.
A. THE EFFECTS OF INCARCERATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS ON THE LONG-TERM
TRENDs IN HOMICIDE
These facts can guide our understanding of the causal pat-
terns of the post-1977 trend and the short-term fluctuations in
homicides. As we saw in Figure 1, crime was rising at a robust
level starting in the mid-1950s, but for almost two decades there
was virtually no increase in incarceration in response to this
higher level of crime.
Indeed, as Figure 3 reveals, from 1967 through 1973 the
rates of incarceration were below 100 per 100,000 for the only
time in the last half century. The strong anti-incarceration sen-
timent in the late 1960s and early 1970s succeeded for a time in
reducing the prison population at a time of enormous growth in
crime. 8 Beginning in 1974, however, a sharp and unrelenting
upturn in incarceration began, and we are now at a historically
unprecedented level of roughly 450 inmates for every 100,000
individuals in the country.
Within a few years after 1977, the aging of the baby boom
cohort also contributed to the slow long-term decline in homi-
cides.' 9 Today, the cohort aged thirty-six to forty is the most
," Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 3; Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in
New York Cir A Tale of Two Trends, 88J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277 (1998).
,6 Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 3.
1I1d
" Figure 3 documents the reduced reliance on incarceration at a time when Figure
1 shows crime was rising sharply.
9 Steve Levitt, The Limited Role of Changing Age Structure in Explaining Aggregate Crime
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plentiful five-year age span in America. ° If one thinks of the
five-year span from age eighteen to twenty-two as the peak years
of crime, then it was eighteen years ago that demographics
started to operate in favor of crime reduction. Steve Levitt
notes that after twenty years of adverse demographic influences,
murder rates between 1980 and 1995 fell 8% due to the chang-
ing age structure of the U.S. population (when the total decline
in murder rates was 20%) .21 But the benefit of a roughly 0.5%
per year drop in murder rates owing to demographic shifts has
now ended. From 1995 through 2010, demographics should
play little role in aggregate U.S. homicide rates.22
The basic story then is that sharply increasing incarceration
rates that lagged the sharp growth in crime succeeded by the
late 1970s in altering the trend path of crime, and that the re-
sulting new slow downward trend was sustained by continuing
sharp increases in incarceration and benign demographic shifts.
With the prison population rising at roughly 6.6% per year since
1974, crime might be expected to fall by roughly 1% per year.2 3
These facts suggest that the prediction that the slow post-1977
downward trend will continue may be somewhat optimistic.
Given the high expense and diminishing marginal returns of
increased incarceration at this point, it is hard to imagine that
the prison population will grow much further in the future.
20 Id
2 From 1960 through 1980, the murder rate grew by 20% owing to the changing
age structure (when the total increase in murder rates was 101%). Id.
2 The reason for this result'is that while the proportion of Americans aged 15-24
will be rising, the proportion aged 25-39 will be declining and the proportion of eld-
erly Americans will grow. The net effect of these conflicting influences on crime will
be roughly zero. Id. at 10. It is possible that the effect of the changing age structure
could be modestly worse than Levitt suspects since he does not separately analyze the
influence of race. At present, the increase in the size of the highest-crime age cohort
is roughly 1% per year for whites, but almost double that for African-Americans (who
have far higher murder rates than whites). See Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 3,
at 1184 fig. 3.
"3I estimated the growth of the prison population in the same fashion that I esti-
mated the growth in the homicide rate. See supra note 4. The prediction that the in-
creasing incarceration reduced crime by about 1% per year assumes that the elasticity
of crime with respect to incarceration is roughly 15%. SeeJohnJ. Donohue III & Pe-
ter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle against
Crime, 27J. LEGALSTUD. 1, 13 (1998).
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Moreover, the roughly 0.5% per year downward pressure on
crime from the baby bust is now over. Certainly, if the two ma-
jor long-term influences acting to depress crime over the last
two decades are removed without the introduction of other
crime-reducing influences to replace them, then even the mod-
est long-term downward trend is threatened. Recall that this
post-1977 downward long-term trend has been roughly 0.6% per
year.2' When increasing incarceration was dampening crime by
roughly 1% per year and demographics were dampening crime
by another 0.5% per year, crime was only falling at 0.6%. 2 If
the increase in incarceration were to stop during a period in
which demographics are no longer diminishing crime (and pos-
sibly increasing it), it would not be surprising that even the slow,
post-1977, downward trend in crime would be imperiled.
B. EXPLAINING THE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE LATE 1980S AND 1990S
1. The Rise of the Late 1980s
Part II (A) above showed how increasing levels of incarcera-
tion and favorable demographic trends contributed to the slow,
post-1977, secular decline in crime. These fairly steady influ-
21 See supra text accompanying note 4.
Note that in the post-1977 period, increasing incarceration, increasing police
forces, and favorable demographic shifts all operated to reduce crime. The first of
these three effects alone is predicted to have reduced crime by roughly 1% per year,
while overall crime fell at only 0.6%. This implies that other long-term factors must
have been operating to increase crime. It is also worth speculating whether the esti-
mated effectiveness of incarceration as a crime control strategy has been diminishing
over time as the percentage of the prison population made up of drug offenders and
older prisoners (as a result of longer sentences) has risen.
Recently released data for the first half of 1998 indicates that the murder rate
dropped to 6.3 per 100,000. The post-1977 trend line estimated in Figure 1 might be
artificially elevated because of what I argue is the crack-influenced crime spike of the
late 1980s. If one were just to compute the annual percentage decline in crime from
the Figure 1 predicted peak of 9.5 in 1976 to the early 1998 value of 6.3, the figu.re
would be 1.86%, which is slightly greater than the estimated annual 1.5 percent de-
cline attributable to increased incarceration and the changing demographics in the
post-1977 period. In other words, it is possible that we are now where we would have
been in the absence of the crack epidemic, and that the true post-1977 trend showed
even a greater decline than predicted by the rising incarceration rate and favorable
demographic trends (presumably augmented by increasing numbers-and effective-
ness?--of public and private police and other private security measures).
UNDERSTANDING THE TIME PATH OF CRIME
ences cannot explain the sharp run up in crime that begins in
the second half of the 1980s or the equally sharp decline that
begins around 1993. It seems fairly likely that the introduction
of crack cocaine and the ensuing battle for control over its dis-
tribution during a period of strong anti-drug law enforcement
explain the crime increase starting in -1986. Indeed,. in retro-
spect, it seems clear that the pattern of increasing juvenile crime
and gun violence was the direct result of these factors. The in-
troduction of a highly lucrative illegal product required the de-
velopment of a vast distribution network involving hundreds of
thousands of sales workers. At a time when intense incarcera-
tive pressure was being applied to adult offenders and a boom-
ing economy was creating a relative labor shortage, it was not
surprising that the group with the fewest options in the legiti-
mate economy and the least to lose from the criminal justice sys-
tem-young, inner-city African-American males-would be
drawn into the drug trade. Moreover, the recruitment of vast
numbers of young drug sellers, coupled with a great need for
continuing replacement as the prisons swelled with those con-
victed on drug charges, together contributed to an environment
where the growth of gun violence was entirely predictable.
Young boys carrying large sums of illegally obtained cash need
to find some way to protect themselves from older predators
(and each other), and handguns are simply the logical answer.
In the late 1980s, the magnitude of the cocaine market was
estimated to be as high as $60 billion per year.26 Reasonable as-
sumptions about the relative sizes of the shares of capital and
labor in this industry suggest that the need for workers in such a
large industry would be substantialY.2  Between 1987 and 1991,
21 See infra, Figure 4.
' A reasonable estimate of the labor share of output for- a legitimate business
might be 75%, which, if applicable to an illegal industry, would mean that roughly
$45 billion could be labor's share of the drug market. Even if the illegal nature of the
industry would lead to highly skewed earnings and only half of this amount was paid
to workers, the total number of drug workers would still be very high. To get a crude
sense of how many workers this might entail, one might estimate the average earnings
of a full-time drug worker to be about $24,000 per year. (The best study on this issue
estimates that full-time drug dealers earn about $2,000 per month, on average. PEE
REUTER, ET AL., MONEY FROM CRiME; A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEAU NG IN
WASHINGTON, D.C., 49 (1990). This would imply that the number of full-time workers
1998] 1439
JOHNJ. DONOHUE
the number of adults in jail or prison grew by roughly 400,000,
of which approximately 220,000 were African-American and
150,000 were white.28 Moreover, from 1985-1990, the booming
economy led to a shrinkage of almost 500,000 in the number of
whites aged sixteen to twenty-four who did not have legitimate
jobs.29 With the growing crack trade needing literally hundreds
of thousands of workers, almost 400,000 adult drug dealers or
possible recruits hauled off to prison or jail, and 500,000 previ-
ously unemployed young whites now employed in legitimate ac-
tivities, it is not surprising that a significant percentage of the
roughly 1.3 million African-American males aged fifteen to
nineteen were pulled into the crack trade.30 Once juveniles had
a strong need for guns, the guns came, and the rest of the story
is quite predictable-juvenile gun deaths soared, particularly
among African-Americans.'
2. The Recent Fall in Cime
While we can tell a plausible story about why crime rose in
the late 1980s, it is much more difficult to explain why it sud-
denly started back down. We have already seen that incarcera-
tion, demographics, and greater numbers of police are not
likely to be important elements of the story. This leaves us with
the following array of explanations for the crime reduction of
the 1990s: a shrinking drug trade; increased police effectiveness;
declining alcohol use; or improving social/economic forces,
such as the booming economy (since 1992), increased trust in
in the cocaine trade would be close to one million workers. Of course, some of these
workers were involved in the production phase of the cocaine trade outside the
United States, and some were involved with the existing powder cocaine trade prior
to the introduction of crack. But since many of the workers involved in crack distri-
bution did not work full time, it is apparent that there was a huge increase in demand
for low-skilled labor in urban areas to work in the illegal crack trade. Id at xii.28 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl. 6.12.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997,
at tbl. 652 (117th ed. 1997).
" In 1990, the number of African American males aged 15-19 was 1.326 million.
Id. Crack was the great inner-city jobs program of the late 1980's.
" Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-DrugIndustrj, 86J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10, 26-32 (1995).
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government, or strengthened community institutions. I will dis-
cuss these issues in turn.
a. Shrinking Illegal Markets for Drugs
Figure 4 shows that the size of the cocaine and heroin mar-
kets, as measured by total expenditures on these drugs, has
fallen sharply since the peak years of the late 1980s.
This suggests a neat story in which the burgeoning crack
trade increased crime in the late 1980s and the subsequent de-
cline in this trade led to the subsequent drop in crime. But
there are two problems with the story. First, the drop in total
expenditures on cocaine started too early for this factor to ex-
plain the sharp downturn in crime that started in 1993. Most of
the decline in the crack trade came before 1993. Second, while
total expenditures on cocaine have fallen, Figure 5 shows that
the actual volume of cocaine used has been steady from 1990
through 1995.
The declining price at a time when total consumption is
steady suggests that the supply and demand curves have both
shifted in the direction of lowered price (i.e., they both shifted
down) with the offsetting effect being that the quantity con-
sumed remained steady. The outward shift in the supply curve
seems most plausibly to have resulted from the rationalization of
the distribution system. Perhaps the gangs were able to divide
the territory in a way that reduced warfare and facilitated lower
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costs of production. The reduced demand would likely be the
product of learning about the harmful effects of the drug, as
well as various policy measures designed to discourage con-
sumption. While admittedly the data about the drug trade may
be too inaccurate to rely upon, it doesn't provide a simple story
that coincides nicely with the drop in crime (even though the
expanding drug trade and the consequent arming of urban ju-
veniles does explain the initial increase in the second half of the
1980s) .s
Note, too, that if the drug data are to be believed, the drop
in violence is not the result of police pressure driving up the
price of crack. If this were the case, consumption would fall and
prices would rise. But, at least since 1990, prices have fallen and
consumption has stayed constant. Thus, as we think about the
possible influence of more or more effective police, it appears
that any such effects were not more effectively focused in the
1990s on drug dealers, since supply seems to have increased (al-
though police actions directed at drug users may have cut de-
mand).
" Richard Curtis states that "The configuration of the drug markets in the mid-
1990s appreciably reduced the level of neighborhood violence. As distribution re-
tired indoors, turf battles were eliminated, and since organizers of drug businesses
hired a few trusted friends rather than easily replaceable workers, there was less con-
flict between them. Distributors were robbed by users less frequently because they
were more protected selling indoors to known customers." Richard Curtis, The Im-
probable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods. Crime, Violence, Drugs and Youth in the
1990s, 88J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1268 (1998). One factor that could have
allowed these cheaper modes of operation for drug dealers was the declining number
of occasional users of cocaine. The Office of National Drug Control Policy reports
that from 1988-1995, the number of estimated occasional users of cocaine (including
crack) fell from six million to three million. WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHAT AMERICA'S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS,
1988-1995 8 tbl. 1 (1997). This means that the crack distribution networks could re-
trench with this decline in the number of occasional users, who are less known to the
dealers, and therefore more costly to service.
" The reason for the stabilization of the drug market is unclear, especially since
frequent arrests (and ultimate release) of major drug dealers would continue to pro-
voke new battles over turf. Perhaps the stabilization merely reflects the time it takes a
newly created illegal market to mature. Or perhaps the falling price of cocaine re-
duced the vigor of turf battles and diminished the amount of robbery and burglary to
which users were forced to resort.
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b. More and Better Police?
I have previously expressed some doubt (based on limited
data) concerning the argument that increasing numbers of po-
lice can explain the drop in crime, but there is much discussion
of the improved quality of policing. Temporally, the story that
the New York police made a breakthrough in police strategy
and that others have emulated these practices does have some
support. William Bratton, who is widely regarded as having in-
troduced the new police strategies first as the head of the Tran-
sit Police and then more broadly upon becoming
Commissioner, assumed full command beginning in 1994,
about the time of the sharpest crime reductions in New York
City.34 The ideas that he embraced were certainly in the air at
the time, and perhaps the other cities that have experienced
similar reductions in crime, such as Houston, were implement-
ing them as well.ss On the other hand, the cities of Los Angeles
and Washington, D.C. did not change policing strategies and
crime fell considerably in both cities as well-buttressing the
view that a decline in crack-associated violence has caused the
crime decline.36
' The story in New York is confounded by the fact that the number of police was
growing sharply at the time crime fell, so it is unclear whether the increased police
presence or the different policing strategy caused the crime reduction. See supra
notes 10 and 13.
"Between 1991 and 1996, the number of murders in Houston dropped by 59%,
while between 1992 and 1996, murders in New York City fell by 51%. Fagan et al., su-
pra note 15, at 1282 fig. 1.3.
mSee Fox Butterfield, Drop in Homicide Rate Linked to Crack's Decline, N.Y. TIMs, Oct.
27, 1997, at A12 (noting that ajustice Department study found that "the close link be-
tween crack and homicide may be a fundamental dynamic that explains why homi-
cide rates have declined not only in cities like New York, which have instituted
aggressive police strategies, but also in cities like Los Angeles, where the police have
been demoralized or have not adopted new methods"); Risen, supra note 11, at Al
("Violent crime in the United States dropped 7% in 1996, the fifth straight annual
decline .... Los Angeles reflected the national trend .... All categories of serious
crime, as measured by the FBI's overall crime index, fell by 11.6% in Los Angeles last
year (1996]"). See also Defeating the Bad Guys, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 35 (noting
that "crime in Washington, D.C., has fallen as fast as anywhere, although the police
department has been corrupt and hopeless").
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4. Declining Alcohol Use
Robert Parker and Randi Cartmill have compiled a large set
of findings in support of the view that decreasing alcohol use is
one of the factors contributing to the recent drop in crime.
There is certainly enough suggestive evidence of a link between
alcohol and violence to make this inquiry worth pursuing in de-
tail, and Parker and Cartmill have done an excellent job in can-
vassing the work in this area to which they have contributed
significantly. Figure 1 of their paper suggests that per capita al-
cohol consumption began declining at roughly the time that
crime peaked, which may suggest that the decline in drinking
was part of the long-term decline in crime that we have referred
to as the post-1977 trend. Of course, the difficult question that
must always be confronted in exploring such issues is whether
the observed link between alcohol consumption and crime is
causal or purely correlational. For example, Parker and Cart-
mill cite a finding that the density of liquor stores in a city was a
significant predictor of the change in homicide rates.38 But one
could imagine that the liquor stores are an indicator of the de-
gree of social decay, and that when random malign events
strike, such as the emergence of the crack trade, the degree of
social decay predicts the magnitude of the increase in homicide.
If liquor stores are just serving as a proxy for social decay, then
other measures of social decay might show a similar correlation
with murder, even though no causal link would be apparent.
For example, the number of potholes on the street, the pres-
ence of a methadone clinic, or the number of check-cashing
stores might all correlate with homicides without causing crime.
The possibility of such a problem is reflected in Parker and
Cartmill's finding that wine consumption is associated with less
crime, which they note "probably reflects the social class posi-
tion of wine drinkers rather than any preventive effect of wine
consumption for white homicide."' 9 While I agree with their
"' Robert Nash Parker & Randi S. Cartmill, Alcohol and Homicide in the United States:.
1934-1995-Or One Reason Why U.S. Rates of Violence May Be Going Down, 88 J. GRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1369 (1998).
I. at 1366.
" Id. at 1383.
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specific conclusion, it could also be the case that other findings
of a positive link between alcohol and homicide are similarly the
product of the social class of the drinkers.
While teasing out the causal influence of alcohol on crime is
quite difficult, Parker and Cartmill note that a growing array of
different studies across time and in different geographic areas
buttress their conclusion that there is such a causal link.40 My
own sense is that the social costs of alcohol consumption are
enormous-indeed the social costs of the deaths caused by
drunk driving may outweigh the social costs of murder.4' There-
fore, steps to reduce alcohol consumption are likely to be very
worthwhile, even if the link between street crime and alcohol is
not definitively established. In light of the framework that I
have advanced in this paper, it is also worth noting that while
the post-1977 secular decline in crime was highly variable, the
decline in alcohol consumption has been steady. This suggests
that any influence of the decline in alcohol consumption on
crime reduction is more likely to contribute to the slow secular
decline in crime rather than to the sharp decline in crime of the
last few years.
40 One potentially significant counterexample to their contention is that when
Prohibition was repealed, consumption of alcohol soared according to their Figure 1,
but crime dropped sharply. This finding may not be fatal to their case, however.
First, it is possible that, when Prohibition ended, the measured consumption of alcohol
rose more sharply than did actual consumption. Sales of illegal spirits could well have
been widely undercounted. Second, one lesson of the late 1980s is that illegal drug
markets can contribute mightily to increased crime, and it is possible that the end of
Prohibition reduced crime greatly by virtue of the elimination of the illegal market
even as it stimulated crime to a lesser degree through the increase in alcohol con-
sumption.
Perhaps a useful technique for isolating the effect of alcohol consumption on
crime would be to explore the effect of sharp increases in alcohol taxes, which might
generate exogenous decreases in alcohol consumption, thereby making the causal
link between alcohol consumption and crime more direct.
4' In 1995, the last year for which we have data, the number of deaths caused by
drunk driving was 17,596 while the number of murders equaled 21,600.
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl. 3.95. If many of the murder victims are themselves
criminals/drug dealers, then it is conceivable that society loses more from the poten-
tially random deaths inflicted by drunk drivers than from murders, which might be
disproportionately targeted at criminals.
412 See Parker & Cartmill, supra note 37, at 1361 fig 1.
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d. Social and Economic Forces
The improved economy is another possible explanation that
corresponds at least roughly with the post-1993 downturn in
crime.4' This factor has probably played somewhat of a positive
role, but it seems unlikely that a shift of the magnitude that we
have experienced could result from this source alone.
In his interesting paper for this conference, Gary LaFree
advances the broad thesis that
[T] he postwar American crime boom occurred as a result of an in-
stitutional legitimacy crisis characterized by (1) growing distrust of po-
litical institutions, (2) rising economic stress and (3) increasing
disintegration of the family.... If these same arguments hold for the
1990s, then the crime bust should be accompanied by evidence of in-
creasing trust in political institutions, declining economic stress, and
growing stability of families, as well as increasing support for criminal
justice, education, and welfare institutions.
44
While I found LaFree's hypothesis quite intriguing, I have
argued above that the recent run up in crime in the second half
of the 1980s, and possibly the subsequent fall during the 1990s,
is closely related to changes in illegal drug markets-a topic that
LaFree does not mention. Indeed, many of the factors that La-
Free focuses on as possible explanations for the recent drop of
the 1990s are probably much more plausible factors for the slow
secular decline since 1977 that we see in the predicted crime
line of Figure 1. The long-term social trends that LaFree fo-
cuses on are unlikely to explain the post-1993 sharp drop in
crime anymore than they can explain the roughly similar drop
in crime in the early 1980s (or the subsequent increase in crime
in the late 1980s) .4' Finally, the greater trust of institutions that
LaFree mentions as a cause of the recent drops in crime is
probably at least as much caused by the reduction in crime-
consider the benefits accruing to Mayor Rudolf Guiliani from
" The unemployment rate fell from 6.9% in 1993 to 5.4% in 1997. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, supra note 29, at tbl. 652.
' LaFree, supra note 3, at 1343.
45 Again, factors that change gradually over 30 years would not seem to be likely
candidates for explaining a recent abrupt change in crime over the last five or six
years.
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sider the benefits accruing to Mayor Rudolf Guiliani from the
good news about crime in NewYork City.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that over the last half century there
have been two long term trends in homicide rates: an increase
of roughly 4.4% per year from the mid-1950s through the late
1970s, and a modest downward trend of about 0.6% per year
since then. If long-term trends told the whole story about
crime, then the big story about crime occurred in the late 1970s
when the sharp increase in crime was brought to a halt. Since
then the slow long-term decline in homicides has been pleasant
but not dramatically good news. 46 But long-term trends are only
part of the story. There are also large short-term variations
around the long-term trends. In fact, because the short-term
run up in crime owing to the consequences of the rise of the
crack trade and the arming of juvenile drug dealers and their
confederates was so large, the retreat from that run up has been
great. Furthermore, with the memory of the high-crime period
so fresh in our minds, the recent continuing drop in crime that
has taken us below the level predicted by the long-term trend
seems even more dramatic. It is really this last drop below trend
which is the surprise, and we must watch during the next few
years to see whether it merely represents some short-term favor-
able phenomenon or the start of a new trend.
Even though one can tell a story that increased police effec-
tiveness of the kind alleged in New York City4 or a general shift
away from lawlessness has improved our long-term prospects
(perhaps because the unyielding pressure of increasing incar-
ceration has finally taken its toll), at this moment there is not
enough information to refute the view that we are currently ex-
periencing a benign short-term fluctuation around the long-
term trend in crime. In fact, since some of the most important
factors that led to the long-term post-1977 downward trend-in-
46 The slow downward trend in homicide rates is dramatically good relative to the
previous upward trend, but since the reversal came two decades ago, it is no longer
news.
" See, e.g., Kelling & Bratton, supra note 10.
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creased incarceration and favorable demographic changes-are
likely not to be present in the future, there may be as much rea-
son to believe that the trend in crime over the next ten years
will be upward (perhaps at the rate of 1 to 1.5% per year) as
there is reason to believe that more and better policing have
ushered in a new era of lower crime.48
In any event, it should be clear that, while massive increases
in incarceration undoubtedly contributed to the reversal in the
late 1970s of two decades of sharply rising crime, they have had
only a small effect on homicide relative to the magnitude of the
short-term fluctuations we have experienced over the last two
decades. Our policy tools are weak relative to the influences on
crime that can operate very powerfully in the short term, as the
experience of the sudden emergence of crack in the late 1980s
showed. Even a substantial 50% increase in the total prison
population is likely to induce only a roughly 7.5% decrease in
homicides-which is almost certainly below the public's thresh-
old of perception.4 9 Furthermore, while the gains from incar-
ceration when aggregated over many years can be large, the
attendant costs are constantly rising. Doubling the prison popu-
lation from 250,000 to 500,000 cost roughly $9 billion extra per
year to generate a roughly 15% drop in crime.0 The next dou-
bling of the prison population from 500,000 to one million has
" In the post-1977 period when crime was dropping at 0.6% per year, incarcera-
tion and demographics combined would have generated a 1.5% per year drop. This
implies that some other long-term phenomena were causing crime to rise by 0.9% per
year (and perhaps more if the growth of public and private police were factored in).
Therefore, if nothing else changed and the effect of incarceration and demographics
were removed, one would expect crime to rise by 0.9% per year. If the effect of
demographics proves to be somewhat pernicious in the future and if increases in the
numbers of police come to an end, crime might rise by 1 to 1.5% per year. Moreover,
as The Economist recently observed, "by 1999 the first generation of babies born when
their mothers were addicted to crack will start to reach puberty. By 2000, three-fifths
of black youths turning 15 will have been born to single mothers." ECONOMIST, supra
note 36, at 35.
" It has frequently been true that in years of declining or stable crime, the public
has been convinced that crime is rising. Marc Miller, Cells vs. Cops vs. Classrooms, in
THE CRIME CONUNDRUM 127, 134-35 (Lawrence Friedman & George Fisher, eds.,
1997). The public's inability to sense modest declines in crime, coupled with the
presence of large short-term variations in crime, can make the policy of incarceration
look utterly feckless, even when it provides modest benefits.
50 Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 23, at 18.
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cost us an extra $18 billion per year to generate another 15%
drop in crime. Importantly, that second doubling cost twice as
much as the first, with no sign of greater benefit! We are now
incarcerating over 1.5 million prisoners, and a further doubling
would cost about $55 billion. My concern is that either we will
continue to rely on increasing levels of incarceration as the
primary policy instrument to control crime, in which case the
costs will soon rise to untenable levels, or we will desist without
seeking alternative crime control strategies and crime will start
rising. In the late 1960s, the country turned away from reliance
on incarceration, without providing effective crime control
strategies to replace it (although many ineffectual social pro-
grams were pursued). The results were disastrous, especially in
light of the unprecedented difficulties posed by the growth in
illegal drug markets and the movement of the baby boom gen-
eration into their high-crime years. As the children of the baby
boom are about to provide a smaller dose of increased crime,
we must recognize that the long-term upward influences on
crime that have been restrained by increasing incarceration and
greater numbers of police and security measures (both public
and private) may not have abated: While one hopes that new
police strategies can more successfully control crime in the fu-
ture, if the recent sharp drops in crime prove to be evanescent,
other avenues of crime reduction that have not played a role in
the recent drop, and therefore have largely been overlooked in
the current discussion, should be explored further.1
See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 23, at 27-56 (discussing the feasibility and
effectiveness of producing crime reduction through promising social programs, such
as pre-school enrichment programs for three-year-olds, and Job Corps training for
teens. Drug legalization could probably reduce crime significantly (as it did when
Prohibition ended in 1933), but the social costs of greater drug use might be very
high. A social scientist might like to see if legalizing marjuana in selected states
(coupled with a ban on advertising and an educational campaign designed to dis-
courage use) could achieve some partial crime reduction without generating large
offsetting social costs).
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